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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW HAVE A FUTURE?*
DR. ADDA B. BOZEMAN**

It is a great honor to be in the company of New York Law School
lawyers; and more specifically lawyers who are concerned with both international and comparative law. Elsewhere in academe these two
fields of legal concern are usually treated in isolation from each other.
Each has its own clientele and its own law review; at times it even
looks as if their respective custodians are barely on speaking terms.
Yet, and this is my main thesis tonight, international and comparative
law are interpenetrating and mutually supportive in all matters of substance. In fact, the answer to the question whether international law
has a future depends almost entirely on just what studies in comparative law reveal. And since I am persuaded that public international law
is today in a critical phase of decomposition, I ardently wish that comparative law would come to the rescue sooner rather than later. Let me
explain the thinking that leads to this conclusion.
The future of men and of their ideas and institutions is shaped not
only by the present but also by the past. This means, in the case of
international law, that we should reflect on the seventeenth century
when this code of norms for the conduct of relations among states first
emerged in a systemized form. The genius responsible for this composition was, of course, Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist, historian, diplomat
and poet.
It so happened, a few years ago, that I was asked by the Grotius
Society at the Hague to help celebrate the 400th anniversary of this
great man by writing an essay entitled "On the Relevance of Hugo
Grotius and De Jure Belli ac Pacis for Our Times."' I admit that the
* This is the text of an address delivered at the annual banquet of the Journal on
March 25, 1985.
** Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville,
New York; Barrister at Law of the Middle Temple Inn of Court; J.D., Southern
Methodist University School of Law; Diplom6e of Section Diplomatique, Ecole Libre des
Sciences Politiques, Paris.
1. See Bozeman, On the Relevance of Hugo Grotius and DE JuRE BELLI Ac PAcs for
Our Times, 1 Grotiana65-104 (1980). This is the first volume of the "new" Grotiana; the
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assignment was difficult but it has proven to be one of the most enrich-

ing and scholarly experiences of my life.
Among the relevancies "for our times" which I discovered in writing that essay are a few that bear directly on the theme we are discussing tonight. One of them is that the "father" of international law pioneered comparative studies of law before he felt ready to pronounce
himself on just what constituted an international consensus.
2
As you know, Grotius's chief work, The Rights of War and Peace,
was designed to pacify and unify Christian Europe, whose nations had
been tearing themselves apart in warfare after their religious and political unity had waned. The fundamental question that moved Grotius
was this: how may war be justly waged and peace justly maintained in
the new European society of independent states? With this concern
steadily in his mind, he explored the records of history, law, religion
and philosophy of a great variety of European peoples. The aim was to
isolate their modes of reasoning, their insights into human nature,
their convictions of what is just and what is injust, then compare the
findings and determine upon which values and norms Europe's diverse
nations could be said to converge.
Most of Grotius's witnesses were Greeks, Romans and Christians,
and his richest source of inspiration was no doubt Roman law, specifically the laws of contract and property. Several factors explain this
close linkage with classical jurisprudence. First, the civil law was and
continues to be the base of internal order in each of the continent's
separate realms. Second, it was generally esteemed as "written reason,"
a reliable carrier of accepted values and a code of precepts for diplomacy and for the orderly and intelligent conduct of government. Third,
it was and is to this day the core of Christianity's Canon law. In short,
Roman law had functioned for centuries as Europe's de facto international law. 8
As scores of sections in the massive Grotian oeuvre reveal, however, Grotius did not rest his case on these readily available records.
Rather, he was determined to examine the pre-Roman and pre-Chrisjournal had been discontinued in the 1940's.
2. H. GRorIUs, DR JuRE BELLI AC PACs [THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE] (Paris 1625)
[hereinafter cited as GROTS] For a listing of published editions of Grotius's works, see
The Grotius Collection at the Peace Palace, A Concise Catalogue, 3 GROTIANA 94-98
(1983).
3. On the singular importance of the Roman law for the Occidental cultural world in
general and the evolution of international law in particular, see BOZEMAN, POLITICS AND
CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL HIsToRy 162-212 (1960); see also Bozeman, supra note 1, at
97. For Grotius's focus on law and history, see id. at 95; Prolegomena, infra note 4, at 38,
40, 46; GROTIUS, supra note 2, bk. 2, ch. xviii, at 7.
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tian laws and law-related norms of Europe's indigeneous peoples. He
seems to have first conceived of this dimension of law when he compared his native Dutch law to that of Rome. Later, when he served as
Sweden's ambassador to France, he proceeded to compare the laws of
the Visigoths, Ostrogoths, Franks, Langobards, Angles, Saxons and
other Nordic peoples with those of the Romans, an effort which convinced him that the former were in many respects superior to the
latter.
The reasoning behind these investigations, Grotius tells us, was
that one cannot understand the soul of a people unless one knows its
laws as well as its history. It is this double focus which explains why he
could recognize the significance of the fact that Gothic laws were duly
resuscitated after the Spanish provinces had been liberated from the
Muslims; that the constitutions then in force in the Kingdom of Naples
and in Sicily had their origin in the laws of the Langobards; that England was ruled by Norman law to a considerable degree, and, in short,
that the Germanic peoples had firmly implanted their laws wherever
they went. Furthermore, and in the same vein, Grotius realized clearly
that no common international maritime law could have arisen had it4
not been for the excellence of the Island of Gotland's municipal law.
The other source of the new European law of nations is of course
the New Testament. The Old Testament is cited frequently, but Grotius admitted in The Rights of War and Peace that he had difficulties
in reconciling God's law and natural law with the law of Moses. Thus,
he insisted that the virtues required of Christians "are not enjoined to
Hebrews in the same degree." Likewise, he noted that the special law
given to the Israelites did not bind strangers to whom it was not given,
and that Christ abolished those parts of the Mosaic law which formed
a wall of separation between Jews and other nations. 5
There is a reference in The Rights of War and Peace to the "lawless Arabs" but Grotius did not examine the Koran and commentaries
4. Grotius developed his interest in comparative law early when he examined his native Dutch law in counterpoint to that of Rome, but it was toward the end of his life that
he took occasion to explore the properties of various Germanic legal orders and to compare them with those of Roman law. This work remained incomplete but it was published in the Prolegomena of Historia Gotthorum, Vandalbrum et Langobardorum [A
History of the Goths, the Vandals and the Langobards] (Amsterdam 1655) (hereinafter
cited as Prolegomena]. For an extended analysis of these writings see Andreae, Une
Etude de Droit Compare par Grotius, 10 GROTIANA 29-44 (1947); see also Van Eysinga,
Quelques Observations sur Grotius et Le Droit Romaine, 10 GIOTIANA 18-28 (1947).
5. GROTIUS, supra note 2, bk. 1, ch. i, at 16 and bk. 2, ch. xv, at 9. For Grotian
approaches to Arab and Mohammedan norms of behavior in international relations and
for Grotius's reasoning in excluding them from his scheme, see Bozeman, supra note 1,
at 98-104.
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on the Islamic law of war. Nor was his attention attracted to the intricate principles and practices of diplomacy and war prevalent in the
Islamic Mogul Empire, the different Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms of
India, or Southeast Asia and China. All of them were irrelevant to the
task upon which he had set himself; namely, to reunify Christian Europe around shared principles and beliefs.
The second group of "relevancies" which I selected for this evening's occasion relates to the following: Grotius was persuaded that the
problems in a given state's foreign relations could be neither understood nor resolved unless they were perceived and analyzed in the context of ruling domestic or internal norms and values. Contrary to the
persuasion much in vogue today that nations can or should be expected
to conduct their foreign policies in ways unrelated to the fundamental
beliefs and dispositions operative within their societies, Grotius insisted on anchoring his chief themes, and they relate after all to war
and law in interstate relations, in the concepts that control each state's
inner order.
As The Rights of War and Peace shows conclusively, Grotius argued from the law of persons, contract, property and crime to the law
of nations. It would not have occured to him to reverse the process and
affirm, as is the custom today, that the rights of persons or citizens in,
for example, China, India, Saudi Arabia, Guinea-Bissau or any of the
Marxist-Leninist societies can be determined by the fiat of an international covenant or a declaration of universally applicable rights. Thus,
if he had found in the course of studying Chinese law and history that
the family law or the penal law was radically different from the one
common to European nations, as it was and is, or that the Chinese
rendition of natural law has nothing in common with the natural law
philosophy of the West, he would not have been ready to assume that
Europe's ius gentium was appropriate to China. The chances are he
would have read the T'ang and Ch'ing codes, the writings of Chinese
philosophers, especially those of the perennially influential Legalists,
and the records of imperial diplomatic transactions so as to discover
the "soul" or mind of the Chinese.
Documents such as these were not available in translation in the
early seventeenth century, but they have been in our libraries and law
schools for quite some time and have obviously also been read. What is
so odd today is that the knowledge thus acquired makes no difference
when it comes to the conduct of foreign relations. To stay with the
Chinese example for a moment, Henry Wheaton's Elements of International Law6 was translated into Chinese in the nineteenth century,
6.

H.

WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF
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and it was generally assumed in the West that China would relate to it
affirmatively. No one either in academe or the diplomatic corps, however, made much of the "Foreword" to the Chinese edition. Here, an
important Chinese official announced that his government might not
follow the practices and propositions set out in the work, but indicated
that the book could nonetheless serve as a useful aid to Peking in planning a "border defense"- a Chinese euphemism for coping with aggressive barbarians, in this case the "red-haired" Western ones. In this
one sentence you find, in my view, the measure of the difference between two totally different ways of conceptualizing the conduct of foreign affairs; that of the West and that of China.
Understanding China, or any other non-Western state, including
those associated with Marxism-Leninism, comes easily when one follows the Grotian method. As indicated earlier, this consists of finding
out what the guiding norms of the internal order are. In China, these
center on the family hierarchy and the ethics of family relations, and
on a public system of criminal punishment that has been of frightening
severity in all dynasties. In the past, China's international order was
modelled on the same sets of principles. In the sinocentric universe of
Asian peoples, the emperor was thus cast as the Son of Heaven and the
omnipotent father to all other states or peoples on the Chinese periphery, for they, in turn, were viewed not only as younger or older sons
but also as totally inferior barbarians. If imperial guidance proved ineffective, punishment in the form of war ensued as a matter of course. In
other words, the twin notions of state sovereignty and equality were
not accepted and a ius gentium was, therefore, not fathomable.
The message for comparativists in jurisprudence, then, is this:
comparative law must be operational on two levels if it is to serve the
cause of international law. The first requires comparisons among internal systems of ordering human relations and decisions as to which societies can be grouped together to form an international system and
which societies, by contrast, have to be excluded if one's own society is
to survive. Only when this has been completed can one proceed to the
second level, where the challenge calls for comparing and coping with
different international systems. The premise for both undertakings is
the recognition that the international or outer order is ineffectual unless it reflects the norms and values dominant in the component national or inner orders. The occidental states system could center on
international law only because its component units, whether monarchies, republics or free cities, were states which subscribed genuinely,
and not just rhetorically, to shared norms and values.
THE SCIENCE

(Philadelphia 1836).
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Two further observations are pertinent. Comparisons of international systems, and many can be distinguished in the seventeenth century as in our times, show convincingly that the law of the Western
nations is the only recorded international scheme that is anchored in
secular law. It is also the only one that became universally applicable,
at least for a brief span of time, and therein lies a tale.
The international law that issued from comparative studies in the
seventeenth century was a meaningful and effective house law for Europe because its norms were organically linked to extensions of national domestic legal orders, whether in common law or civil law states.
What, then, were the characteristics of the West's classical law of nations? In which ways have they changed? Are they applicable to the
modern world society?
In the Grotian design, as well as today, the pivotal concerns
relate
territorially
defined
state
and
to
the
laws
of
war
and
to the sovereign,
is
exceedingly
peace. Each of these closely related sets of conceptions
complex and, therefore, not readily transferable outside the cultural
milieu that created it. This was clearly recognized by scholars and
statesmen until the First World War. For example, when you open the7
first edition of L. Oppenheim's text International Law, A Treatise
you find a nice explanation of why it was deemed possible to extend
the European order to the Ottoman Empire, Siam and Japan. Intricate
comparative studies had preceded decisions on these memberships, although political calculations had also played a part. But the aspect of
greatest interest to a comparative lawyer relates, in my view, to the
close studies which oriental authorities undertook before they decided
from which Western systems of law they would borrow, so as to modernize their countries' internal legal orders.
The Western authorities, meanwhile, wanted to be sure that they
were dealing with territorially bounded sovereign states, which understood not only the ground rules of international law, but, and this is
noteworthy, those rules implicit in the system of the balance of power.
Commenting on these two prerequisites, Oppenheim notes that if
states cannot keep one another in check, no rules of law would have
any force because an overpowerful state would naturally try to disobey
the law. In other words, no claim was made between the seventeenth
and mid-twentieth centuries that the law of nations was a jural order
above the society of states. Rather, and contrary to present day trends
in American thought and policy, it was viewed as a law regulating relations among consenting, legally equal states. Needless to say, no one
thought that international law was tantamount to foreign policy, a the7.

L.

OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATIS

30, 73, 147 (1905).
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sis that has been making the rounds in the United States in recent
times. Further, and also counter to present day trends, the stress
throughout the earlier era was on the absolute right of a sovereign
state to defend its national interests by resort to war. Following Grotius, it was explicitly acknowledged that war had its legal and moral
justifications, as did peace.
Certain Grotian insights and wisdoms, by contrast, were allowed to
wither even though many of these insights speak more directly to modern problems in international relations than those officially espoused in
our times. For example, Grotius is clearly right on target today when
he defines war as "the state of forcibly contending parties,"'8 thereby
allowing non-state actors to be counted in; when he explains that peace
and war are not always the stark opposites they appear to be; and
when he warns that "war is not the worst of destinies," for nothing is
worse, he insists, than the loss of liberty and the fatal weakening or
destruction of the state.
Other passages in The Rights of War and Peace contribute greatly
to a clarification of the relation between war and peace and of that "no
war, no peace" syndrome with which many in the modern West cannot
come to terms. Grotius thus writes that wars are often interrupted by
truces, and that truces may go on for as long as one hundred years. 0 In
other words, he tells us to accept the possibility, which is cast away by
modern international law, that a state of belligerence may be frozen
into a state of "cold war" for an indefinite period. Enduring international peace, by contrast, is presented by the father of international
law as a remote condition. The prophesy of Isaiah that the time will
come when nations "shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their
spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
neither shall they learn war anymore"'" is in Grotius's view irrelevant
8. GROTIUs, supra note 2, bk. 1, ch. 1,at 1. The Grotian definition of war does not
exclude private war. It is more ancient than public war, and he argues, "has, incontestably, the same nature than public war." Id.
9. Peace is not the leading or supreme reference in the Grotian scheme, nor is it
treated as ethically always superior to war. Both are subordinated by Grotius to the
primary consideration which is physical and moral survival. Grotius thus sided with
Livy, who held that peace when coupled with servitude is a far more grievous calamity
than all the horrors of war, and with Tacitus, who wrote that a wretched peace is well
exchanged for war. Id. bks. 1-3.
10. For careful arguments in support of this most interesting proposition see GROTIUS, supra note 2, bk. 3, ch. xxi. Grotius concludes that "war is a name for a situation
which can exist even when warlike operations are not being carried on." Id. bk. 3, ch.

xxxi, at 1.
11.

Isaiah 2:4.
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insofar as the justice of war is concerned. 12 It merely describes the
state of the world that would come about if all nations would submit to
the law of Christ. Temporary peace, by contrast, is attainable but it is
always limited in time as well as space, and it can be maintained only
when the state's armed forces are in readiness. 3 ([Secretary of Defense) Cap Weinberger would approve of this, I think). On this score
Grotius suggests strongly that any internationally effective law of war
must take into account any kind of war as well as any kind of sovereign
warring entity.
Most of these important understandings of war and its relation to
peace had been dropped by the beginning of the twentieth centuryjust when they would have helped the West to adjust to radical
changes in the composition of the world society and to come to terms
with Marxist-Leninist and non-Western political systems and doctrines
of conflict and war. Instead, one notes that in our times international
law has been allowed to drift into conceptual decomposition and political irrelevance. Rather than continue the tradition of examining the
internal structures of foreign societies before determining whether they
can be accommodated securely by our orders of domestic and international law, it is simply assumed today that they either do or should live
by our norms and axioms; that all men everywhere love peace and abhor war, and that they, therefore, are or should be committed to the
laws of war and peace as we understand them.
The combination of negligent laissez-faire and simplistic rigidity,
which has come to mark political thought in academe and government,
supplies, in my view, the context in which international law has slithered into something of a nonsystem, at times even into a deceptive
cover for flagrant lawlessness. In these circumstances it is not surprising that no one seems to want to think systematically about questions
such as these:
1) Is "the State" still the only subject of international law when
half of the world's so called states are in no way either sovereign or
territorially defined? And how should international law treat such new
politically sovereign organisms as the totalitarian transnational communist party and its Soviet apparat of executive committees, buros
and secret police agencies, the conspiratorial command posts of border12. GROTIUS, supra note 2, bk. 1, ch. ii, at 8.
13. Id. bk. 2, ch. xxii, at 5. Grotius is wholly in accord with Tacitus, who commended
the noblest of the Germanic peoples on the ground that they were always prepared for
war without ever provoking it, and that they were therefore capable of upholding their
reputation in the midst of peace. Grotius also sides with Tactius in his insistence that
the peace of nations cannot be preserved without armies, that armies cannot be maintained without pay, and that pay cannot be supplied without taxation.

19851

FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

defying terrorist organizations and fanatical religious sects, or such
strictly personalized aggressive war states as Colonel Quaddafi's Libya?
These entities openly avow their determination to bring ruin to established independent states, and, as the record shows, they have been
eminently successful in their undertakings.
2) Just what is "International War" now that it is no longer possible to view it as the exclusive function of "the State" and what is the
meaning of "the Law of War" to which so many dense academic texts
are dedicated? As many of you know, these questions have long ceased
being academic. "What is War?" was the title of an article in The Wall
Street Journal not too long ago." The article concerned a legal case
involving the Aetna Insurance Company and Holiday Inns, Inc.," in
which Holiday Inns sought to collect for the destruction of its Beirut
hotel. The federal judge ruled that the fighting there did not constitute
war and, therefore, the insurer was liable.
Further, just what is war when we insist on excluding guerilla warfare, terrorism, covert war and all foreign military interventions deliberately camouflaged as "internal civil war" or "insurgency"? This, I
think, was the main issue in the libel trial that General Westmoreland
brought against CBS.1 6 Paul Nitze explained it authoritatively in his
testimony on the enemy strength and order of battle question by indicating that "in a war [i.e., the Vietnam War] that .. .was part conventional, part terrorist, part psychological and part political . . .he
was uncertain in 1967, as now, what importance to attach to forces that
'could be one thing one day' and 'the next day be something else.' "117
The realities of war today, then, are not adequately covered by the
traditional Western code of international law in which war is presumed
to begin when some state violates the territorial jurisdiction of another
state. Furthermore, and also counter to the preceding era, war is no
longer viewed as the last resort in foreign policy and peace is not the
overriding concern of the plurality of nations. Rather, it is incontrovertible that values supportive of hostility and recourse to violence
have eclipsed those making for cooperation and peace, and that statehood has come to rest, in most provinces of the world, upon ideologies
and traditions which do not respect either law or spatially fixed borders. In these conditions it is hardly ever possible to set interstate war
14. Lipman, What Is War? Court Ruling Forces Insurers to Address Increasingly
Difficult Question, Wall St. J., Nov. 3, 1983, at 33, col. 3.
15. Holiday Inns, Inc., Holiday Inns, Inc. (Lebanon) v. Aetna Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp.
1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
16. Westmoreland v. CBS, No. 82 Civ. 7913 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 30, 1982).
17. Farber, Paul Nitze Takes Stand in CBS Trial, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1984, at B4,
col. 4.
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apart from internal warfare, revolution, insurgency, counterinsurgency
and that vast conglomerate of different species of guerilla combat in
which recent generations of men in all regions of the global society
seem to find political, professional and ideological fulfillment.
War is fluid and formless in today's world. It does not begin with a
declaration of war or with an act of aggression that can be pinpointed
in terms of time and space. Instead, one finds that most wars today are
nurtured in webs of deliberate covert action or "active measures" (in
Soviet tactics and parlance), and in theories stipulating protracted war
and the revolution without frontiers. In other words, they are enacted
from within the states targeted for takeover.
Other modern wars, among them Black Africa's coup d'etat wars
and the scores of tragic sub-wars between power-seeking religious sects
and separate sovereign armies that have been finishing off the state of
Lebanon in the last decade, are primarily private wars. Neither can be
analyzed or controlled effectively by reference to standing classical
rules of the law of nations, because these had been conceived in opposition to codes governing irregular warfare and in the assumption that
only states were the subjects of organized international relations.
These realities continue to be bypassed by modern authorities on
the law of war and peace. For example, just what is one to make of the
following definition; it would surely have perplexed Hugo Grotius:
International law is the standard of conduct, at a given time,
for states and other entities subject thereto. It comprises the
rights, privileges, powers, and immunities of states and entities
invoking its provisions, as well as the correlative fundamental
duties, absence of rights, liabilities, and disabilities. International law is, more or less, in a continual state of change and
18
development ....
So understood, international law is indeed a nothing, and the conclusion with which I began this presentation is justified: that the term
"development" as used in this definition really stands for "decomposition." After all, it surely cannot be denied any longer that the core
concept of the law of nations, namely that of the sovereign law-conscious state, has been jettisoned; that the law of war which is the essence of the West's classical international system is in shambles; and
that the word "peace" has shed whatever norm-setting meanings it
once possessed. Floating, imprecise and devoid of relevance in world
politics, international law has been allowed to degenerate into empty
18.

1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1963).
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rhetoric.'
Should Americans today acquiesce in the defeat which enemies of
international order have been allowed to inflict on one of the West's
greatest intellectual and political contributions to the cause of conflict
resolution in the multicultural world or should they go to work, in the
Grotian tradition, and reexamine existing assumptions, correct inadequacies in light of changed actualities and come up with realistic responses to the challenges implicit in a legally, morally and politically
divided world? Clearly, only the latter course is worthy of the present
generation of talented lawyer-citizens.
The task at hand requires the realization that any international
system, including that of international law, is only as solid as the concepts that combine to compose it. In regard to our embattled subject
matter, this means that we simply cannot go on adding to or subtracting from it at will. In short, we must stop ad-libbing international
law in cheap deference to the desires for the broadest political consensus in the world society. Instead, we should start to identify and distinguish the greatly various local and regional orders with which our order
coexists. Only after today's world has been mapped reliably and objectively in this way, will we muster the intelligence to know just which
basic norms in Western, non-Western and Marxist-Leninist societies
are sufficiently compatible to make for a universally valid international
order.
It goes without saying, I hope, that the needed intelligence requires a well-planned program of comparative studies. For international law can have no future unless specialists in both international
and comparative law cooperate closely.

19. For a more complete analyses on these themes, see BOZEMAN, supra note 3, particularly the conclusion (at 161-86) and the appendix (at 187) analyzing the Brezhnev Doctrine; Bozeman, The Future of InternationalLaw in a Multicultural World: A Preliminary Estimate, in PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
85, 104, 189 (R. Dupuy ed. 1984). See also Bozeman, The Nuclear Freeze Movement:
Conflicting Moral and Political Perspectives on War and Its Relation to Peace, 5 CONFLICT: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

271-305 (1985); Bozeman, Covert Action and Foreign

Policy, in INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1980's: COVERT ACTION 15-79 (R. Godson
ed. 1981); Bozeman, InternationalLaw, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
455-72 (A. de Conde ed. 1978); Bozeman, War and the Clash of Ideas, 20 ORalS 61-102
(1976).
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